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THE NATIVE AMERICAN STRUGGLE BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, 




Four days following his inauguration, President Donald Trump signed 
an executive order “expedit[ing]” the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), 
otherwise known as the Bakken Oil Pipeline.1  This executive order sparked 
new rounds of protests by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe, and environmentalists, who opposed the construction of the DAPL for 
a variety of reasons.2  The DAPL is a 1,172-mile pipeline, which carries 
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 1  Peter Baker & Coral Davenport, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/keystone-dakota-pipeline-
trump.html?_r=0; see also Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Revive Dakota 
Access, Keystone XL Oil Pipelines, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-gives-
green-light-to-dakota-access-keystone-xl-oil-pipelines/?utm_term=.d8c4c7ec3797; Madison 
Park, 5 Things to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline, CNN (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/us/dakota-access-pipeline-explainer/. 
 2  See, e.g., Sam Levin, Last Stand: ‘Water Protectors’ Return to Standing Rock as 
Drilling Set to Begin, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/feb/08/standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline-last-stand; Blake Nicholson, 
Deadline Looms for Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Camp, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-dakota-access-pipeline-camp-
deadline-20170220-story.html. 
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crude oil from North Dakota to Southern Illinois.3  Protests over its 
construction began during the summer of 2016, and they continued 
throughout the remainder of the year.4  The protests garnered national media 
attention, including stories of protesters being sprayed with water in freezing 
temperatures.5  On December 4, 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers “denied 
a permit for the construction of a key section of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline.”6  This was not a permanent ban on the construction of the DAPL, 
but rather a temporary decision not to issue an easement to cross Lake Oahe 
until the Army Corps of Engineers could prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS).7 
On January 24, 2017, however, President Trump ordered the Secretary 
of the Army to instruct the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 
and the Corps to rescind the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare the EIS and to 
consider prior reviews, including the Environmental Assessment and finding 
of no significant impact, as fulfilling federal law.8  On February 7, 2017, the 
Department of the Army rescinded the NOI, and on February 8, the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers granted the necessary easement for the 
DAPL to cross under Lake Oahe, without performing the EIS.9  As expected, 
the local tribe filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction until after the Corps 
fulfilled its duty to conduct an EIS.10 
The plaintiff in the case was the Oglala Sioux Tribe, which is a part of 
the Great Sioux Nation.11  It claimed that there was a risk of an oil leak from 
 
 3  See Mufson & Eilperin, supra note 1; Alexander Sammon, A History of Native 
Americans Protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-
sioux-standing-rock-jill-stein. 
 4  Mufson & Eilperin, supra note 1; Sammon, supra note 3.   
 5  See, e.g., Tim Stelloh et al., Dakota Pipeline: Protesters Soaked with Water in 
Freezing Temperatures, NBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/dakota-pipeline-protesters-
authorities-clash-temperatures-drop-n686581. 
 6  Nathan Rott & Eyder Peralta, In Victory for Protesters, Army Halts Construction of 
Dakota Pipeline, NPR (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/12/04/504354503/army-corps-denies-easement-for-dakota-access-pipeline-says-
tribal-organization. 
 7  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Oglala Sioux Tribe v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:17-cv-267 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Oglala 
Complaint]. 
 8  Id.; see also Baker & Davenport, supra note 1 (quoting President Trump: “I am, to 
a large extent, an environmentalist, I believe in it. . . . But it’s out of control, and we’re going 
to make it a very short process.  And we’re going to either give you your permits, or we’re 
not going to give you your permits.  But you’re going to know very quickly.  And generally 
speaking, we’re going to be giving you your permits”). 
 9  See Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 3. 
 10  See id. 
 11  Id. at 4. 
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the DAPL.12  Because the tribe is located, along with other Native American 
tribes, downstream from the easement, it was concerned that if an oil leak 
were to occur, it would lose access to its clean drinking water.13  In addition, 
it was concerned that an oil leak would destroy the waters, which it considers 
to be sacred.14  Therefore, not only were there environmental legal issues 
involved, but there were also cultural and religious issues that the tribe 
claimed were not adequately considered.15 
Since the protests and lawsuits began during the 2016 summer, the 
media attention led to social media protests with hashtags such as 
“#standwithstandingrock” and “#noDAPL.”16  The media attention has not, 
however, led to a discussion of larger issues faced by the Native American 
tribes across the United States and even Canada.17  For example, “[t]he 2 
million Natives in the U.S. have the highest rate of poverty of any racial 
group—almost twice the national average.”18  Many scholars disagree as to 
 
 12  Id. at 16 (“The Tribe is deeply concerned about the risk of a DAPL spill and the 
threat that the 570,000 barrels per day pipeline poses to its sacred Treaty- and statute-protected 
waters.”). 
 13  Id. at 16–17 (“A crude oil spill from the DAPL into Lake Oahe would damage the 
ecology of the river basin, impair the Tribe’s rights, and contaminate the drinking water of 
the Tribe’s citizens.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2012) (“The Congress hereby finds and 
declares that . . . it is the policy of the United States, that all Indian communities and Indian 
homes, new and existing, be provided with safe and adequate water supply systems and 
sanitary sewage waste disposal systems . . . .”). 
 14  Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 16; see also Angela R. Riley, The History of 
Native American Lands and the Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 369, 369 (2013) (“For . . . 
indigenous groups—as is a common attribute of indigeneity of similarly situated groups 
around the world—this land was and is holy land.”). 
 15  See Oglala Complaint, supra note 7, at 16, 19. 
 16  See, e.g., #STANDWITHSTANDINGROCK #NODAPL, ACLU OF KENTUCKY, 
http://www.aclu-ky.org/articles/standwithstandingrock-nodapl/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2017); 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, FACEBOOK (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:59 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/Standing-Rock-Sioux-Tribe-402298239798452/. 
 17  See Skiers v the Religious Rights of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
24, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21710857-case-supreme-court-will-
set-noteworthy-precedent-skiers-v-religious-rights (“The nature of [the Ktunaxa First 
Nation’s] faith, which assigns sacred value to features of the landscape, poses a puzzle for the 
courts.  The Ktunaxa maintain that skiers will drive away the grizzly-bear spirit, making their 
rituals meaningless.  Canada’s Supreme Court must now decide whether that danger 
represents an infringement of the religious freedom established by the constitution, and 
whether that infringement is justified.”). 
 18  Naomi Schaefer Riley, One Way to Help Native Americans: Property Rights, 
ATLANTIC (July 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/native-
americans-property-rights/492941/ (“This deprivation seems to contribute not only to higher 
rates of crime but also to higher rates of suicide, alcoholism, gang membership, and sexual 
abuse.  As of 2011, the suicide rate for Native American men aged 15 to 34 was 1.5 times 
higher than for the general population.”). 
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why Native Americans have struggled to achieve economic growth.19  There 
are, however, two specific factors that seem to be of particular concern.20  
First, due to the allotment system that was established in 1877 under the 
Dawes Act,21 tribal land has been fractionated to such extreme measures that 
most of the land is either unused or unnecessarily costly to use effectively.22  
Second, due to the fact that most tribal land is held in trust by the United 
States, Native Americans lack the ability to build equity since they do not 
hold full property rights.23 
One problem that Jessica Shoemaker has mentioned in her scholarship 
is that most studies try to simplify issues and just address either property 
 
 19  See id. (“Many say the federal government is not giving American Indians enough 
money to combat these problems. . . .  Others—often researchers in the academy—argue that 
American culture does not give Natives enough respect, continuing to traffic in stereotypes 
when it comes to sports teams and mocking those who claim to have Indian heritage.”); see 
also Brian Sawers, Tribal Land Corporations: Using Incorporation to Combat Fractionation, 
88 NEB. L. REV. 385, 387 (2009) (“[T]he Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation 
Economies identified 2320 individual obstacles in forty major categories.  Among the most 
frequently cited impediments to economic development are the remoteness of most 
reservations, few resources/poor land, burdensome federal regulations, and tribal politics.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 20  See Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, 
Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 492 (2017) (“[S]cholars frequently talk 
about one issue in isolation—most often fractionation, or sometimes the restrictiveness of the 
federal trust status.  Other scholarship is focused on historic inequities in the colonial takings 
of Indian lands and that history’s impact on the modern race-based inequities in property 
distribution in the United States.” (footnote omitted)). 
 21  General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341–42, 348–49, 354, 381 (2012)). 
 22  See Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in My Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land 
Tenure Problem, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 444 (2014) (“Nonetheless, some renewed 
recognition of the potential for reinstating informal owner’s use rights on Indian lands, in light 
of the expansive needs for housing, income, and development among Indian people, and the 
large chunks of unused land theoretically owned by these individuals, has exciting 
potential.”). 
 23  See Jacob W. Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Missing Sticks: Property Institutions and 
Income Dissipation in Indian Country 1 (Geo. Mason Univ. Dept. of Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 15-22, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2536597 (“Because new 
land owners did not receive possession of their legal titles, they could not sell, gift, mortgage, 
or lease their land without approval from the secretary of the interior.”); see also Shoemaker, 
supra note 22, at 383 (“This article focuses on another change in individual Indians’ property 
rights that has not previously been identified or studied in-depth: the gradual elimination of 
any presumptive right of individual Indian owners to use and possess land they jointly own 
with one or more co-owners.  This modern Indian property rule means that Indian co-owners 
of land enjoy no default right to use and possess their own property.”).  See generally 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST 
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5 (2001) (“[T]he major stumbling block that keeps the rest of 
the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital.”). 
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rights or issues related to fractionated land.24  Obviously, trying to solve 
these problems in isolation is not an adequate solution, because there are so 
many moving factors even beyond legal and economic property rights, 
including the overlap of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction.25  In addition 
to the complex jurisdictional issues, there are also tribal issues such as 
cultural preservation and protection of religious land.26  Therefore, this Essay 
recommends a flexible corporate solution that will address many of the 
issues mentioned above.  The corporate solution proposed is very similar in 
nature to a corporate solution proposed by Brian Sawers, in which tribal land 
corporations purchase fractionated land through eminent domain.27  
Sawers’s corporate solution is based off of the Rosebud Tribal Land 
Enterprise,28 and includes minor changes to improve overall effectiveness.  
This Essay will add to Sawers’s corporate solution by discussing how this 
solution provides the necessary flexibility to allow Native American tribes 
to not only address issues related to fractionated land and the ability to build 
equity, but also to preserve their cultural and religious identities. 
In Part I, I will provide a brief history of Native American property 
rights in order to explain how the current issues have developed over time.  
In Part II, I will address the current issues facing Native American economic 
growth, in particular the lack of traditional property rights and the 
fractionation of their lands.  In Part III, I will explain why focusing on just 
one of the above issues will not solve the problem, and will offer a corporate 
solution that allows enough flexibility to provide tribes with an efficient 
model for economic growth.   
I.     BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Before discussing the history of Native American property rights, it is 
important to note that although the United States Constitution does in fact 
“contemplate[] the existence of Indian nations” and Native American 
 
 24  Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 492 (“Even property law scholarship, if it addresses 
Indian land tenure at all, often misses the full picture of the modern Indian land tenure 
challenge.  For example, scholars frequently talk about one issue in isolation—most often 
fractionation, or sometimes the restrictiveness of the federal trust status.”). 
 25  Id. at 491 (“Tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction swirl together in complex and often 
unpredictable ways, and where they apply, federal rules for trust properties tend to be blunt, 
deeply bureaucratic, and insensitive to the tremendous diversity among tribal territories and 
on-the-ground circumstances.”). 
 26  Id. at 494 (“Despite all this, however, many indigenous communities in the United 
States maintain fundamentally important and diverse relationships with specific physical 
places.  These connections, many have argued, are critical and foundational to Indian identity, 
culture, and even survival.”). 
 27  See Sawers, supra note 19. 
 28  See id. at 413–19. 
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sovereignty,29 it does not give constitutional rights to Native American 
tribes.30  Therefore, when the Supreme Court heard its first case regarding 
Native American property rights in Johnson v. M’Intosh,31 the Court was 
setting precedent as to what rights Native Americans had to their land as 
compared to the European settlers.32  The Court concluded that Native 
Americans had the right to occupy and use their land, but they did not have 
the right to transfer or dispose of their land, because “discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it.”33  This decision laid the groundwork 
for the trust system that is currently in place today—and many of the 
problems associated with the trust system.34 
The trust system was formally established through the General 
Allotment Act of 1877, otherwise known as the Dawes Act, and was only 
supposed to exist for twenty-five years.35  Through this Act, the federal 
government took tribal lands and held the lands in trust.36  In turn, the federal 
government redistributed this land in allotments to the head of Native 
American households.37  The stated purpose of the trust was as follows: 
[To] allow Indian landowners who used a “common property” approach 
to land to adjust to formal real estate procedures and notions of individual 
private property, while relying “upon the government of the United States 
to protect their property and personal interests . . . [from] the dubious 
attempts of self-seeking traffickers in Indian ignorance and credulity.”38 
 
 29  Riley, supra note 14, at 383; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall 
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes . . .”). 
 30  Riley, supra note 14, at 383. 
 31  21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 32  See Riley, supra note 14, at 372. 
 33  Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (“Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, . . . 
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”); Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (“It is well settled that in all the 
States of the Union the tribes who inhabited the lands of the States held claim to such lands 
after the coming of the white man, under what is sometimes termed original Indian title or 
permission from the whites to occupy.  That description means mere possession not 
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.”). 
 34  Riley, supra note 14, at 372. 
 35  General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341–42, 348–49, 354, 381 (2012)); see also 
Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 492–93.  
 36  § 5, 24 Stat. at 389. 
 37  § 1, 24 Stat. at 388. 
 38  Jacob W. Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Divided Interests: The Increasing Detrimental 
Fractionation of Indian Land Ownership, in UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS 
130 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., 
INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 780 (1928)). 
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Another reason for the Dawes Act was to force Native Americans to 
assimilate into U.S. culture.39  One way in which the government did this 
was by selling surplus lands—lands that were not allotted to Native 
Americans—to non-tribal members, and checkerboarding these surplus 
lands with the allotted parcels.40  The sale of surplus land led to Native 
Americans seeing “roughly 100 million acres of reservation land unilaterally 
leave Indian control. . . .  The 100 million acres that Indian tribes ceded to 
the federal government as surplus land represented roughly two-thirds of 
their original reservation land base.”41  In addition to forfeiting the land, 
many argue that the federal government sold the more valuable land, leaving 
the Native American tribes with the less valuable land.42 
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).43  This 
act put a stop to “any further allotment projects,” “placed all individually 
owned Indian land and tribally owned land into the federal Indian trust,” and 
“indefinitely extended the trust relationship between Indians, their tribes, and 
the U.S. federal government.”44  The Dawes Act and the IRA have had 
devastating effects on Native Americans and their property rights, including 
massive fractionation of tribal lands.45  This fractionation led to the absurd 
reality that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) actually spends more taxpayer 
money per year in order to manage some of the parcels than those parcels are 
able to collect in payments.46  Therefore, in 1983, Congress passed the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), which allowed “the secretary of the interior 
to acquire fractional interests in land previously allotted to individual Native 
Americans, consolidate them at the tribal level and hold them in trust for the 
 
 39  Sawers, supra note 19, at 391 (“[T]his law [was] a mighty pulverizing engine for 
breaking up the tribal mass.” (quoting Merrill E. Gates, Addresses at the Lake Mohonk 
Conferences (1900), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE 
“FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880–1900, at 339–40, 342 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973))); see 
also id. (“Allotment was an ‘experiment in social engineering,’ ‘hop[ing] to indoctrinate 
Native Americans to the European concept of private ownership.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting MICHAEL L. LAWSON, HEIRSHIP: THE INDIAN AMOEBA 1 (1982) (incorporated as part 
of S. 2480–S. 2663: Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
98th Cong., 76–104 (1984)))). 
 40  Id. at 388. 
 41  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 130 (citation omitted). 
 42  See Sawers, supra note 19, at 395–96 (“To accommodate non-Indian buyers of 
surplus land, the best agricultural land and timber were not allotted to Indians.”). 
 43  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 130. 
 44  Id. 
 45  See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text (discussing how fractionation occurs 
and the effects of fractionated land); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) 
(“There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious public 
problem.”); Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 493. 
 46  See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 686 (1998). 
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tribe’s benefit.”47  The plan was to consolidate “overly fractionated parcels 
by providing for small allotment interests to escheat to the tribe on the 
owner’s death.”48  The Supreme Court in Hodel v. Irving,49 however, held 
that the regulation constituted a taking, and because the regulation did not 
provide for just compensation, it was unconstitutional.50  While Hodel was 
pending before the Supreme Court, Congress enacted some amendments to 
section 207 of the ILCA,51 the escheatment clause.  These amendments 
required, among other things, that in order for the interest to escheat, it must 
be “incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years [following the] 
decedent’s death.”52  In Babbitt v. Youpee,53 the Supreme Court again found 
that section 207 was an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.54 
II.     CURRENT ISSUES FACING NATIVE AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
As mentioned above, it is very challenging to pinpoint one reason as to 
why Native Americans have the highest rate of poverty of any racial group 
in the United States.55  It is a very complex issue,56 and the arguments range 
from inadequate funding from the federal government,57 to lack of respect in 
American culture,58 to traditional property rights.59  There is no one solution, 
and there may be no right solution for all tribes, as will be mentioned below, 
but it is important to understand the detrimental effect of the current laws 
regulating Native American property rights, and in particular the effect these 
laws have had on Native American economic growth. 
A.   Fractionation of Lands 
One of the results of the Dawes Act and the IRA was to limit the ability 
of Native Americans to transfer their lands.60  The trust system that resulted 
allowed for land transfers “only through devise or, in most cases, through 
 
 47  David C. Smith & Dustin T. Greene, The Current Battle Over Native American Land 
Allotment, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/779503/the-current-
battle-over-native-american-land-allotment. 
 48  Heller, supra note 46, at 687. 
 49  Hodel, 481 U.S. 704.  
 50  Id. at 717–18. 
 51  25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (1994), invalidated by Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
 52  Sawers, supra note 19, at 401 (alteration in original) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a)). 
 53  Babbitt, 519 U.S. 234. 
 54  Id. at 237; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 401 (“Note the absurdity in permitting 
the federal government to restrict alienation severely during life, but not after death.”). 
 55  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 56  See Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 489–95. 
 57  See Riley, supra note 18. 
 58  See id. 
 59  See id. 
 60  See Heller, supra note 46, at 685. 
148 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 92 
intestacy.”61  Therefore, as land was passed down over time, the parcels were 
split into smaller and smaller interests.  Without the ability to transfer land, 
even amongst each other, individual Indian landowners gradually lost the 
presumptive right “to use and possess land they jointly own with one or more 
co-owners.”62 
The Supreme Court in Hodel recognized this problem, stating:  “The 
policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the 
Indians. . . .  Because the land was held in trust and often could not be 
alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew over 
time.”63  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor mentioned one particular 
“egregious”  example, Tract 1305.64 
Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces $1,080 in income annually.  It is 
valued at $8,000.  It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive less than 
$.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than $1.  The largest 
interest holder receives $82.85 annually.  The common denominator used to 
compute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000.  The 
smallest heir received $.01 every 177 years.  If the tract were sold (assuming 
the 439 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be 
entitled to $.000418.  The administrative costs of handling this tract are 
estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,650 annually.65 
It is interesting that the Court held that taking the smallest interests at 
the time of death would constitute a taking, when the value of that taking is 
four percent of a penny.  The issue of fractionation, however, is clearly 
articulated by Justice O’Connor’s example. 
Making the issue of fractionation worse is that allotment “disrupted 
Indian ranching, largely because allotments were much smaller than the size 
of an efficient ranch.”66  Obviously, fractioning the allotments into smaller 
interests each generation would only make this more difficult.  Therefore, 
organizational costs increase for Native Americans who own an interest in a 
parcel, and it becomes very inefficient to manage one of these parcels.67  
Although Congress has been attempting to solve the problem of fractionated 
 
 61  Id. 
 62  See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 383. 
 63  Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987). 
 64  Heller, supra note 46, at 686. 
 65  Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 398 n.109 (“Since the 
BIA will not issue a check for less than $5, it will take 88,652 years before this heir will 
receive payment.”). 
 66  Sawers, supra note 19, at 394 (“In contrast to the expectations of many non-Indians 
about allotment, Indian fears were prescient: allotment ultimately permitted ‘white settlers . . . 
[to] monopolize the grazing.’” (alterations in original) (quoting W. H. Clapp, Report of Pine 
Ridge Agency, in 1898 ANN. REP. OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 276 (1898))). 
 67  See id. at 393–99. 
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land since 1983, the efforts have been largely unsuccessful.68  In 2010, “there 
were 154,443 individually owned land parcels on Indian reservations, [and] 
because of fractionation the ownership of these parcels [was] split into 
millions of shared claims.”69  In an empirical study in 2014, Jacob Ross and 
Thomas Stratmann found “that increased ownership fractionation has 
reduced the incomes of American Indians on reservations and is associated 
with lower agricultural lease income, a measure of land productivity.”70 
B.   Lack of Traditional Property Rights 
In discussing why fractionation has had a negative impact on the 
economic growth of Native Americans, Ross and Stratmann stated that 
“[f]ragmented ownership is not a problem as long as property rights are well 
defined and enforced, and transaction costs are sufficiently low.”71  
Therefore, it is clear that property rights and fractionated land are both 
important when discussing current issues facing Native Americans and 
economic growth.  But what are the fundamental property rights that Native 
Americans are currently lacking? 
There are two main traditional property rights that Native Americans 
lack, either because of the trust system or due to the fractionated parcels.  
First, because the land is actually owned by the federal government in a trust, 
Native Americans cannot transfer their interests in the land, except by devise 
or inheritance.72  Second, unless an individual owns one hundred percent of 
a parcel, they are not able to occupy or use any portion of that parcel, unless 
“that individual . . . first receive[s] permission from the other co-owners or 
obtain[s] a lease approval from the BIA.”73  With the increase in fractionated 
parcels into ever-smaller fractions, receiving the permission from the other 
co-owners can obviously be very costly, if not impossible. 
Regarding my first point, Hernando de Soto demonstrated in his book, 
The Mystery of Capital, “that the major stumbling block that keeps the rest 
of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce 
capital.”74  In addition, even when poorer nations have the necessary assets, 
“they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose 
ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses 
 
 68  See id. at 399–402. 
 69  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 1. 
 70  Id. at Abstract. 
 71  Id. at 1. 
 72  Id. at 4. 
 73  Id. at 12. 
 74 DE SOTO, supra note 23, at 5 (“Capital is the force that raises the productivity of 
labour and creates the wealth of nations.”); see also Riley, supra note 18 (“Indians have long 
suffered from what the Nobel Prize-winning economist Hernando de Soto has called ‘dead 
capital.’”). 
150 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 92 
with undefined liability, industries located where financiers and investors 
cannot see them.”75  Therefore, these assets “cannot readily be turned into 
capital.”76  For example, these assets cannot be used to obtain a mortgage, to 
leverage investments, or as collateral for a loan.77 
In particular for Native Americans, landowners are not the sole owners 
of their land, because the land is technically held as a trust by the federal 
government.78  In most cases, this is even more complicated because the 
fractionated land parcels have led to landowners not even owning the right 
to occupy or possess the land, as discussed below, but rather they own an 
interest in the proceeds received from the land.79  Therefore, these 
landowners, or interest owners, cannot “perform ordinary real estate 
transactions.”80  This has resulted in Native American landowners, or interest 
holders, suffering from the inability to acquire capital—“the major 
stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from 
capitalism.”81 
In order to fix these problems, some scholars recommend the best 
solution would be to give the land to the Native Americans.82  The federal 
government could easily transfer the property out of the trust and to the 
Native Americans.83  At this point, Native Americans would have the right 
to transfer the land to anyone they choose, including non-Native 
Americans.84  In this scenario, the Native American tribes would retain 
autonomy over the land, similar to how a city such as New York City retains 
autonomy over its land.85 
The problem, however, is that this ignores many of the other issues 
facing Native Americans.86  As mentioned above, many indigenous people 
 
 75  DE SOTO, supra note 23, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 4. 
 79  See Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 520. 
 80  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 4 (“They could not sell, gift, mortgage, or lease 
their parcels without approval from the secretary of the interior.  Inheritance, the only 
mechanism available to alienate an ownership claim, was also limited by allotment policy.”). 
 81  See DE SOTO, supra note 23, at 5; see also Riley, supra note 18 (“Almost no one on 
the reservation can afford to build a home, because no one can get a mortgage.  And no one 
can get a mortgage because the property on the reservation is held in trust by the federal 
government; most of it also is ‘owned’ communally by the tribe.  No bank could ever foreclose 
on a property, because the bank can’t own reservation land.”). 
 82  See Riley, supra note 18. 
 83  See id. 
 84  See id. 
 85  Id. (“[The land] would remain part of the city, just as no one can sell a part of New 
York City to Newark.”). 
 86  See id. (“There are some First Nations leaders in Canada who are skeptical of this 
plan.  They worry that it will lead to greater assimilation, which they see as damaging to 
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view the land as sacred and religious ground.87  The city could regulate 
through zoning what non-Native Americans do on the land, but they would 
still be selling away their sacred land.  It could be argued that they do not 
have to sell the land; however, this argument is flawed because with the 
fractionated parcels many Native Americans would be forced to sell as they 
would not have enough land to use effectively.88  Therefore, it would open 
up the tribal land to the highest bidder, which would likely not be the Native 
American tribes, considering Native Americans currently have the highest 
rate of poverty of any racial group.89  In addition, if the land was just given 
to the tribe from the federal government, as seen in Hodel v. Irving,90 this 
would constitute an unconstitutional taking, unless just compensation was 
provided.91 
As to my second point, in order for a co-owner of a parcel to use or 
possess part of that parcel, they are required to obtain permission from the 
other co-owners or to obtain a lease from the BIA.92  The reason for this is 
because “[t]he federal Indian trust prevents reservation land from being 
subdivided, which means all inherited ownership claims are for an 
‘undivided’ interest (i.e. percentage interest) in the entire tract,”93 rather than 
in a specific acreage or portion of the parcel.  Therefore, Native Americans 
lack the most basic rights of co-tenants: to possess and use the property.94 
The fact that Native Americans do not have a right to possess and use 
their property presents a difficulty for the previously mentioned argument—
that if the federal government just returned the land to the Native Americans, 
they would instantly have access to more capital.95  This is a problem because 
it is not clear as to what land individual landowners would be entitled to 
receive.  If a current owner of two percent of a parcel were to receive two 
percent of the acreage in the parcel, would this make up for their interest?  
Additionally, would all acreage be considered of equal quality?  More 
 
Native culture.  They would be sorry to see a plot of land long occupied by one family sold 
to outsiders.  Some worry that non-Natives will simply take the land illegally.”).  But see id. 
(“Moreover, tribes would retain autonomous rule over the land, even if a particular plot passed 
into the hands of a non-Native.”). 
 87  Riley, supra note 14, at 369. 
 88  See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 89  Riley, supra note 18. 
 90  481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
 91  See id. at 707; see also infra notes 132–41 and accompanying text. 
 92  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 23, at 12. 
 93  Russ & Stratmann, supra note 38, at 131. 
 94  See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 384 (“A defining characteristic of common law 
co-ownership forms is the rule that all co-owners of land have an equal and undivided right 
to possess the entire estate, concurrently and presumptively, without the prior consent of their 
co-owners and typically without any obligation to pay rent for that possession.”). 
 95  See generally Riley, supra note 18. 
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importantly, would two percent of a parcel be enough land to be able to 
efficiently use the land to make a profit?96 
At the time of allotment, “the poorest off-reservation ranches ran fifty 
or more cattle on at least 1000 acres.”97  The parcels, however, were 160 
acres for individuals and 320 acres for heads of a household.98  On a 160-
acre parcel, an individual could “run seven or eight cattle . . . much too small 
a herd to compete with non-Indian ranchers.”99  In addition, the 
undercapitalization, mentioned above, decreased the returns on Native 
American farming activities because they did not have the resources to 
irrigate the land.100  Therefore, even by providing Native Americans with the 
traditional co-tenant rights of possession and use, it is very unlikely that 
Native Americans would be able to use their land effectively.  In addition, 
fractionated land parcels make all of this more challenging and create an 
anticommons problem, assuming all of the individual owners were given an 
“undivided right to possess the whole property.”101  For example, if all 439 
owners of Tract 1305102 had an undivided right to possess the entire 40 acres, 
it would be impossible for any one of them to effectively use the land.103 
III.     THE CORPORATE SOLUTION 
Native Americans should be empowered to make their own decisions 
on how best to find a solution that fits all of their concerns.  This solution 
should include giving Native Americans and Native American tribes more 
autonomy over their lands and more control over how that land is allotted 
and used.  Jessica Shoemaker recommends “grassroots experimentation and 
local flexibility” to create “more radical, reservation-by-reservation 
transformations of local property systems into the future.”104  It is very 
important that solutions be looked at on a reservation-by-reservation basis 
because not all tribes suffer from the same problems.  The corporate solution 
proposed by Brian Sawers provides this flexibility.  This solution allows for 
 
 96  See Sawers, supra note 19, at 398 (“In a study of twelve of the eighteen reservations 
affected by allotment, the GAO found that 20% of parcels had at least one owner with less 
than a 2% interest.  Interests of 2% or less constitute two-thirds of the interests recorded and 
increased from 305,000 to 620,000 between 1984 and 1992.”). 
 97  Id. at 394. 
 98  Heller, supra note 46, at 685. 
 99  Sawers, supra note 19, at 394. 
 100  Id. 
 101  See Shoemaker, supra note 22, at 390; see also Heller, supra note 46, at 687 (“It is 
difficult to imagine how Congress or the Native American tribes can overcome the tragedy of 
the allotment anticommons.  One must wonder how these resources will be returned to 
productive use.” (footnote omitted)). 
 102  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
 103  Note that this would be 0.09 acres per person, if divided equally. 
 104  Shoemaker, supra note 20, at 487. 
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a tribal land corporation to purchase fractionated parcels through eminent 
domain.  Therefore, the corporate solution would solve the issues related to 
the current trust system—transferability of land and collateral in the land—
and the issues related to the fractionated land parcels—use and possession of 
the land.  In addition, the corporate solution gives Native Americans 
autonomous control over the land. 
A.   Examples of Tribal Land Corporations 
In order to solve the problem of fractionated lands, former 
Commissioner of the BIA John Collier created a test case for a tribal land 
corporation.105  The Rosebud Reservation was home to the Sicangu Oyate 
Tribe.106  The reservation received a corporate charter in 1937, and the 
Rosebud Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) was created in 1943.107  At this time, 
sixty percent of the allotted lands were already fractionated.108  The goal of 
the TLE was to: “reduc[e] fractionation and help[] Indians acquire 
economically-sized units of land.”109  Individuals who owned an interest in 
a parcel could tender their interest to the TLE in return for shares.110  These 
interests were then conveyed to the tribe, but managed by the TLE, in order 
to further consolidate the management of the land.111  At the insistence of the 
tribe, the shares in the TLE were transferable.112  Members of the tribe 
received Class A shares, which were entitled to a vote, as long as they 
remained in possession of a tribal member, and non-tribal holders received 
Class B shares, which did not include voting rights.113 
The Rosebud TLE has only been a moderate success, at best.  Some 
criticize the high costs, claiming that “the TLE has been a ‘black hole for the 
financial interests of individual certificate holders.’”114  Proponents of the 
TLE, however, point out that, by 2005 “the TLE had acquired 570,000 acres 
of land for the tribe.  Each year, the TLE generates $3 million in gross 
revenue, of which $2 million is profit.  Between $40,000 and $70,000 is 
spent each month to acquire fractionated interests.”115 
 
 105  Sawers, supra note 19, at 414. 
 106  Id. at 413. 
 107  Id. at 414. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
 110  See id. at 415. 
 111  Id. at 414. 
 112  Id. at 414–15. 
 113  Id. at 415. 
 114  Id. at 418 (quoting Views of the Administration and Indian Country of How the 
System of Indian Trust Management, Management of Funds and Natural Resources, Might 
Be Reformed: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) 
(statement of Hon. Charles C. Colombe, President, Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota)). 
 115  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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The more recent results stem from the ability of the TLE to economize 
larger portions of the land.116  The TLE relies on voluntary transfers, which 
originally led to more checkerboarded interests in the land, and inefficient 
use of the land.117  Over time, however, they have been able to acquire more 
interests, which allows the TLE to be more effective and enables it to 
continue to buy more interests.118  In addition, the shares have a fixed 
price.119  Originally, it was $1 per share, and the landowners who tendered 
their interests would receive one share per $1 of appraised value of land.120  
Over the years, that value was increased, and today, that value is updated on 
an annual basis.121  Therefore, shareholders cannot receive capital gains as 
easily, since it is only valued once a year.122 
B.   The Cobell Settlement and Federal Buy Backs 
The recent success of the TLE shows that an incorporated solution can 
benefit Native American tribes by consolidating the land.  The federal 
government could also assist in this process by returning land to tribes.  The 
federal government would have to pay just compensation, and when the land 
is returned to the tribe, the tribe would then have the ability to incorporate 
under the Indian Reorganization Act.123  First, for tracts such as Tract 1305, 
where the cost of administration is greater than the value and the income of 
the tract, the federal government can and should buy back the land and return 
it to the tribe.  For example, Tract 1305 cost $17,650 annually of taxpayer 
money, when the land is only valued at $8000.124  The federal government 
should buy back the land, at twice the value, and return it to the tribe.  This 
would help return the land to tribal control, while simultaneously saving 
taxpayer money.125 
In addition, the Cobell settlement in 2009 awarded $1.9 billion to buy 
back Native American land and return it to the tribes.126  This was due to the 
 
 116  See id. at 419. 
 117  See id. at 418. 
 118  See id. 
 119  Id. at 415. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  See id. 
 123  Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2012)). 
 124  See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987); see also supra notes 64–65. 
 125  See Riley, supra note 18. 
 126  Tanya H. Lee, Cobell Land Buy-Back Fund Four Million Acres and Billions of 
Dollars Short, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/cobell-land-buy-back-fund-four-
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BIA’s mismanagement of Native American trust funds.127  This is obviously 
a large step in the right direction.  It will, however, still leave four million 
acres of Native American land in a federal government trust.128  Based on 
the BIA’s past performances in managing this land, it is now time to look for 
a solution premised on returning the remaining four million acres to tribal 
control and autonomy, while keeping in mind many of the cultural, religious, 
and environmental concerns. 
C.   The Flexibility of the Corporate Solution Moving Forward 
The Rosebud TLE was more effective with the more land that it was 
able to consolidate.  Therefore, the key to a corporate solution is to acquire 
as much adjacent land as possible to solve many of the issues related to 
fractionated parcels.129  In addition, the shares of a tribal land corporation 
should be transferable, similar to the Rosebud TLE, but they should also not 
be governed by a fixed price.130  Furthermore, the tribal land corporation 
should retain voting and non-voting shares, to ensure that tribal lands 
continue to protect the interests of the individual tribes.  As previously 
mentioned, the Indian Reorganization Act allows tribes to incorporate.131  
Tribes, however, have been reluctant to incorporate, which according to 
Sawers could be due to political disputes among the different tribes.132 
In order to effectively consolidate as much land as possible, tribal land 
corporations should use eminent domain.133  In Hodel v. Irving, the Supreme 
Court held that the escheatment clause in the ILCA was an unconstitutional 
taking without just compensation.134  Therefore, the tribal land corporation 
would need to prove that the taking was for a public purpose and provide just 
compensation to the individuals.135  The first hurdle, taking for a public 
purpose, should be an easy hurdle to overcome.  In particular, in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,136 the Supreme Court held that a program in 
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 128  Id. 
 129  See Sawers, supra note 19, at 422. 
 130  See id. at 421. 
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 132  See id. at 410. 
 133  See id. at 421–25. 
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 136  467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481–82 
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which land was taken from lessors and given to lessees to solve a 
concentrated land tenure problem constituted a valid public purpose.137  
Similar problems arise from the fractionation of land, leading to 
“environmental degradation, poverty, and unemployment.”138  Therefore, it 
appears the Supreme Court would uphold the taking of tribal land as a public 
purpose. 
Proof of just compensation presents a separate hurdle.  Brian Sawers, 
however, presents an interesting solution to this problem.139  As previously 
mentioned, tribes lack the capital to buy back the land themselves, and it is 
important that tribes keep control and autonomy over the land.  Therefore, 
tribes should offer shares in consideration of interests in land, similar to the 
Rosebud TLE.  For any individual who does not wish to receive shares, they 
should be paid-in-kind.140  In particular, they should receive a similar interest 
in another parcel.141  This will allow the corporation to take full control over 
the majority of parcels,142 while leaving a few parcels in trust for the 
individuals who do not wish to tender. 
The benefits of putting the land in a corporation is to allow for a more 
efficient use of the leasing of property, while retaining the control and 
autonomy of the land for the tribes.  In addition, the transferability of the 
shares allows the individual interest holders to acquire additional capital as 
collateral, and the floating price allows for additional capital gains to interest 
holders.  By providing just compensation as like-kind property, this solves 
the holdout problem, because it allows the few holdouts to keep their 
fractionated interest, just in a parcel not controlled by the corporation.  In 
addition, it would decrease the fractionated parcels, and place the 
fractionated parcels near each other, while allowing the remainder of the land 
to be used effectively.  Additionally, instead of using traditional fiduciary 
responsibilities, such as increasing shareholder value, it could be added to 
the bylaws or the charter that the fiduciary duties extend to the tribe as a 
whole.143  Therefore, the voting members, only tribal members, can still elect 
to consider environmental issues, religious issues, and cultural issues 
throughout the corporate decision-making process.  Additionally, this should 
help with the concern of assimilation and preserving Native American 
culture, because the corporation will have control over decisions such as land 
use. 
 
 137  See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229–30; see also Sawers, supra note 19, at 423. 
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The corporate solution presented in this section is similar to the tribal 
land corporation discussed by Brian Sawers.144  The key benefits of this 
solution is it fixes the two main problems that have resulted in the lack of 
economic growth by Native American tribes: issues related to the current 
trust system—transferability of land and collateral in the land—and the 
issues related to the fractionated land parcels—use and possession of the 
land.  In addition, the corporate solution gives Native Americans 
autonomous control over the land.  It allows for flexibility amongst tribes, 
and allows tribes to maintain their religious and cultural identities. 
CONCLUSION 
While the easy solution to Native American property rights would be to 
just return the land to the Native Americans and give them the “full bundle” 
of property rights, this does not solve the entire problem.  Native Americans 
view their land as sacred and they are also very interested in preserving their 
cultural identity.  Historically, the federal government attempted to force 
Native American assimilation.  The result, however, was fractionated lands 
that the Supreme Court has deemed a disaster.145  Therefore, there needs to 
be a more flexible solution to the property rights issue and fractionation 
issues.  For example, by returning the property to individuals with interests 
in the land, this would not solve the problem of fractionation, when so many 
individuals own two percent or smaller fractions of a parcel.  This would 
lead to many individuals selling their interests to non-tribal members and the 
tribe would lose much of its autonomy. 
The corporate solution protects this autonomy, while still giving Native 
American tribes the control of the land.  It allows for tribes to make their 
own decisions on what factors are most important to the tribe.  In addition, 
it would provide a strong, united backing to help fight against what they see 
as dangers to their sacred land.  A tribal land corporation would be able to 
use the resources and capital that it has gained through the consolidated land 
interests to fight back against a proposed pipeline, such as the DAPL, that 
might threaten their access to clean water and might damage their sacred 
land.  The original route of the DAPL was to go through Bismarck, North 
Dakota, a wealthier city than the Native American reservations, but was later 
rerouted by the Corps due to environmental concerns.146  As previously 
mentioned, the Corps has not conducted an EIS on the new route, and it 
would be interesting to see if a consolidated, capital rich tribal corporation 
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could have prevented the Corps from granting an easement for the DAPL 
under Lake Oahe. 
 
